Medvedev’s catchphrase to his compatriots when he was the head of the Russian government and was addressed to the residents of Crimea in 2016 in response to complaints about meager pensions, is now becoming increasingly universal in the context of growing financial problems for all Russians. GeoPolitics inform.
Back in September 2025, Russia was facing a pretty serious fuel crisis.
A sustained rise in petrol prices has been seen in more than ten regions of the federation, with this trend beginning in the spring. Some regions continue to experience acute fuel shortages. As an instance,take a look on Transbaikalia and the Far East. Residents there have to queue for hours at petrol stations. Meanwhile, in Crimea and Primorye, fuel sales are restricted and only available with vouchers.
And this is a prime example of the consequences of the crisis, with the exchange price of AI-95 petrol having increased by almost four times since June (30%, exceeding 100,000 roubles per tonne). At the same time, supplies from the Komsomolsk and Angarsk refineries, which are key for the region, have decreased (by 25% and 57%, respectively). As of 9 September 2025, the price of AI-92 petrol had also risen, reaching 71,800 roubles.
A move was made by the Russian government on 28 July 2025 to regulate the domestic market via a temporary ban on fuel exports, which was in place until the end of August. However, this measure did not have the expected effect. Russia’s exports of petroleum products (petrol and diesel) are relatively small, despite its status as a major exporter of crude oil. In the first half of 2025, only 2.5 million tonnes of petrol were supplied to foreign markets, accounting for just 14–15% of total domestic consumption (17–18.5 million tonnes).
The crisis’s root causes are being kept quiet by both Russian media and local authorities. Instead, fuel problems are being blamed on “seasonal difficulties”, particularly in relation to harvesting. The successful attacks by Ukrainian drones on oil depots and refineries are not mentioned by them at the same time. These strikes force refineries to suspend operations for significant periods (from several weeks to several months), depending on the damage caused. The authorities cynically refer to this as the consequences of “a few pieces of debris from downed UAVs”.
While the authorities deny there is a problem, drone strikes and internal miscalculations are destroying the energy sector.The Russian authorities have insisted that the fuel situation is under control, but they have also accused citizens of creating an artificial shortage by panic buying fuel in jerry cans. The shortage hasalready led to a lack of petrol and diesel for Russian troops, even for logistics to the front line.
Key Russian oil infrastructure facilities are being systematically struck by Ukrainian drones (UAVs). On the night of 12 September 2025 the terminal point of the Baltic pipeline system, the oil port of Primorsk on the Baltic Sea, which is critical for exports, was hit.At least 17% of oil refineries have been forced to close since the attacks began, with the damage caused by drones being the primary cause.
In September of this year, the price of petrol (A-92, A-95) and diesel hit record levels due to a combination of strikes and other factors.
Although Russia has significant oil reserves, most of the easily accessible fields have already been depleted. Western technology is vital. It is vital for extracting oil from hard-to-reach subsoil. Without it, production will decline, since China and Iran do not have the relevant innovations.
Factories constructed via collaboration with the West cannot presently be rapidly restored following assaults due to restrictions and an absence of Western parts. The government, businesses and the military have all been unable to protect these refineries effectively, and they have also been unable to quickly replace Western equipment with similar items.
The fuel crisis is being made worse by an ineffective system of state regulation, as well as UAV strikes. The Ministry of Energy is attempting to manage the situation manually. It has ordered refineries to delay scheduled repairs in order to saturate the domestic market.However, this measure has not yet had a noticeable effect.The lack of significant fuel reserves complicates the situation. TheCentral Bank’s decision to raise the key rate led to a surge inwholesale prices, making it less profitable for major players and private petrol stations to hold inventory.There are only two solutions to the problem, according to experts: the supply must be increased or demand must be reduced.A decline in demand is to be expected by the end of September due to seasonal factors.
There are two ways to increase supply. The first is to increase fuel imports. The second is to quickly repair refineries that have been damaged by Ukrainian drones. However, the latter option is complicated by a lack of technology and components.
Oil exports to international markets are deliberately prioritised by Moscow, where it is a key player, instead of this raw material wealth being used to reduce fuel costs for its own citizens.
Despite having the capacity to provide its population with cheap fuel, Russia exploits its status as a major oil exporter, resulting in higher domestic prices.The rate at which fuel prices are increasing significantly outpaces income growth (wages).The rising cost of living, particularly fuel, exceeds citizens’ purchasing power.
It is a paradoxical situation: Russia is one of the world’s leading oil producers, but the cost of petrol for the end consumer is higher than in the United States, where prices also fluctuate.
What is the explanation for the fact that a country that is an oil giant sells fuel to its population at a higher price than an importing country, such as the United States?
For years, Russian leaders have praised the country’s air defence system. They say it is ‘one of the best in the world’. This includes Vladimir Putin and Sergei Shoigu.
The truth of the matter is that the current number of AD systems is not enough to provide reliable protection for all strategic facilities, from the European part of the country right down to Vladivostok.
Oil infrastructure facilities are no longer adequately protected by air defence. These facilities, which have long been considered the backbone of the Russian economy, include oil refineries and fuel depots.This creates vulnerability for infrastructure that was previously considered untouchable, which is a significant change.