Russia pins great hopes on a managed crisis in Transnistria. With its help, Moscow aims to kill several birds with one stone: to replace the pro-Western leadership in the Republic of Moldova with a pro-Russian one, stop the process of Moldova’s accession to the EU, and, if possible, even force Kyiv to resume the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine to Europe (formally, in the interests of Moldova, but in reality, to continue gas supplies to Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria).
Russia is trying to achieve all of these goals through the energy crisis it initiated on the Left Bank of the Dniester in late 2024, which, according to the Kremlin’s plan, is expected to escalate into a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe by February 2025 (as part of the controlled chaos strategy often employed in Moscow).
Generally, the recent presidential elections in Moldova have shown that the country’s population is not monolithic in its foreign policy orientation. A part of its citizens still look admiringly toward Russia, while the latter does not lose hope of stopping Chisinau’s European integration course and keeping its former colony within its own orbit.
Most supporters of Putin’s dictatorship are concentrated in two autonomous entities within Moldova, Gagauzia and Transnistria, and it is with them that Russia has been working most closely over the past two years (after several coup attempts and the seizure of power in Chisinau by pro-Russian forces with the participation of Wagner Group militants and other foreign mercenaries, mainly from Belarus and Serbia, failed in 2022).
The key fact is that for 30 years, a separatist region with a pro-Russian puppet regime named the “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” (TMR) received “blue fuel” from Russia, de facto, absolutely free of charge. In this way, Moscow was sponsoring one of the zones of instability in the post-Soviet space, through which it planned to reestablish a foothold in these territories (the same applied to Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia).
Instead, de jure, Moscow addressed the demand to pay for the gas supplied to the Left Bank of the Dniester not to Tiraspol (the so-called capital of the Transnistrian region), but to Chisinau. The Moldovan government has never recognized its responsibility for the payments allocated to it, but at the formal level, Chisinau’s debt obligations to the Kremlin were growing and accumulating.
As soon as the European Union granted Moldova candidate status for EU membership, Moscow immediately demanded substantial payment for the gas that had been supplied over decades to pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria (and also sharply increased gas prices for the main part of Moldova). When Chisinau once again refused to settle Tiraspol’s debt and the case was referred to international arbitration courts, Russia responded with tougher, more radical measures – it announced a complete halt of gas supplies to the TMR until the debt was paid. This occurred in December 2024, even before Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas through its territory on January 1, 2025. As for the main part of Moldova, its energy security was significantly bolstered in 2022, with the commissioning of a new pipeline transporting gas from Romania.
Despite the fact that both Bucharest and Chisinau offered Tiraspol energy assistance in a timely manner, the TMR authorities defiantly rejected it, without giving any arguments in favor of their absurd decision. Later, Ukraine also offered to provide humanitarian energy supplies to Transnistria (in the form of both gas and anthracite coal).
However, Tiraspol obediently follows Moscow’s instructions and refuses to provide assistance to the residents of the Left Bank of the Dniester. Russia’s goal is to artificially create a situation of humanitarian catastrophe in the Transnistrian region, accuse the pro-Western leadership of Moldova of irresponsible attitude towards its own population, provoke massive social and economic unrest, and achieve a change of government in the country. At the same time, Moscow will put pressure on Kyiv, Brussels and various international organizations, lobbying for the resumption of transit of Russian “blue fuel” through Ukraine, emphasizing that this will help to overcome the energy problems of the Transnistrian region.
It is also worth paying attention to the fact that the PMR is not only experiencing a shortage of natural gas, but also a serious shortage of electricity, since in the past decades electricity was generated at a local thermal power plant, which operated… of course, on Russian gas, supplied without charge in large volumes.
At present, the Transnistrian CHP plant has urgently switched to operating on coal, some of which was once imported from the Donetsk region of Ukraine, whose territories are now either under occupation or are subject to active hostilities. The anthracite coal reserves in the PMR will last only until the end of January and beginning of February (the intensity of the use of this energy source also depends on how cold the two winter months will be this year).
In general, to ensure the proper functioning of the Transnistrian region, the local CHP plant needs to use a thousand tons of coal per day, which represents a substantial quantity. Even if the TMR does agree to accept humanitarian aid, and the European Union pays for the import of coal from Romania and Ukraine (negotiations are currently underway), these supplies are likely to be insufficient due to the extremely large volumes of coal needed on the left bank of the Dniester.
Considering this, Russia may try to kill yet another bird. For example, Moscow will offer to bring the coal that Tiraspol critically needs by sea from the ports of the Azov Sea. Moreover, the Kremlin may even agree to bear all the costs of purchasing and transporting coal from South Africa. In this case, Turkey will be forced to let Russian barges with lifesaving coal through the Bosporus Strait.
Under these circumstances, as some observers do not rule out, the Russians may try to hide weapons, ammunition, and even small special forces units in the holds of their barges. However, Transnistria does not have access to the Black Sea coast, and all this can get to the TMR only through Giurgiulesti, the sole port in Moldova on the Danube coast that has access to the Black Sea.
It is clear that Moldova’s border guards and customs officers will conscientiously and thoroughly check any ships carrying cargo for the Transnistrian region, not to mention those with Putin’s Russia involved (even if they are labeled as humanitarian supplies). As for a hypothetical attempt by the Russians to insidiously seize the port of Giurgiulesti itself (as part of a special operation), most military analysts consider such a scenario to be extremely unlikely (although, purely theoretically, it cannot be ruled out).
Overall, recent events in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova indicate that Putin’s authoritarian Russia feels confident enough to compete for the restoration of its influence in the former USSR. At the same time, Moscow is currently limited in conducting its hybrid wars and special operations with neighboring states due to the war with Ukraine, which has been going on for almost three years. There is no doubt that a possible Russian victory in this war (or forcing Kyiv into an unjust peace agreement) will only untie the Kremlin’s hands and allow it to intensify the restoration of the empire/USSR in other areas.