Andrej Babiš is the leader of the Czech ANO party, former Minister of Finance and Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, and the founder and beneficiary of the Czech conglomerate Agrofert, which has interests in agriculture, food, and chemical industries, and is also strongly represented in the media business. He attempted to reinvent himself from a pragmatic businessman into a political figure, which was not particularly successful. However, he skillfully monetized the opportunities of public office and, of course, increased his capital.
European Commission documents contain many interesting aspects related to Andrej Babiš and his business structures, which were nominally transferred under the management of third parties. This is not particularly unusual for a politician with multimillion-dollar assets — rather common and straightforward. The conclusions of the European Commission’s auditing bodies note that despite the transfer of corporate management rights of Agrofert to a trust in 2017, Andrej Babiš retained control over the conglomerate, which includes more than 250 affiliated entities across 18 countries.
The most high-profile case concerns manipulations in the agricultural and hotel clusters of the Agrofert group. Under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and small and medium-sized business support programs, Andrej Babiš’s structures received significant subsidies from the European Union. To understand the scale of the schemes: in the agricultural cluster alone, it amounts to about €208 million (approximately 80% are direct payments from the EU, the rest — from the Czech national budget).
For EU institutions, this is an important issue, as it concerns the lawful use of EU taxpayers’ money, the integrity of politicians, and ultimately, the rule of law in a member state.
In August 2025, this unpleasant story for Andrej Babišresurfaced on the agenda, and the current Czech government and Ministry of Agriculture filed a claim for the return of the specified funds. Unsurprisingly, in the context of the parliamentary election campaign (with voting on October 3–4, 2025), this issue raises the political stakes. However, it’s important to recognize that these subsidy schemes are not just relics of the past — they represent a very real risk of being revived if Andrej Babiš returns to power in even more sophisticated manner.
Andrej Babiš considers the accusations politically motivated. However, court losses have only reinforced his image as a “subsidy oligarch.” There is also the “Čapí hnízdo” (Stork’s Nest) case, concerning the receipt of about €2.8 million in EU grants intended for small businesses, which in June 2025 was returned for retrial in court.
There are also nuances and opportunities for manipulation in Agrofert’s media cluster. For many years, Andrej Babiš’s conglomerate owned influential media assets MAFRA and LONDA (Mladá fronta DNES, Lidové noviny, iDNES.cz). In September 2023, an official statement announced their sale to investor Karel Pražák. Formally, this was in line with legislation that limits media ownership by politicians.
However, international experts and human rights advocates highlight the risks of excessive media concentration under one beneficiary. They do not rule out that, with a potential return of Babiš’s team to power, a “recalibration” of the media ecosystem to suit his needs is quite likely.
Such assessments are supported by the precedent set by Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán. In 2018, Hungary’s key media outlets were brought under the KESMA foundation umbrella, forming a media infrastructure of over 470 entities. Soon after, the Hungarian government exempted it from antitrust oversight and inspections under the pretext of “protecting the public interest.”
Eventually, this media-monster was sustained by state budgets, with funding levels depending on loyalty to the official Budapest line. In the end, the structure became a multi-voiced mouthpiece for monotonous messages in support of Orbán and his Fidesz party.
These concerns are further reinforced by the growing partnership between the political circles of Andrej Babiš and Viktor Orbán. In 2024, the Czech ANO party, Hungary’s Fidesz, and Austria’s FPÖ co-founded the “Patriots for Europe” group in the European Parliament. Following the addition of far-right members from France, Italy, and Spain, it became the third-largest group in the EU legislative body. This group opposes support for Ukraine, advocates a significant rollback of EU institutional powers in favor of member-state capitals, and promotes a return to pragmatism in relations with Russia. For these reasons, the perception of Andrej Babiš as the “Czech Orbán” is no longer just a journalistic metaphor.
The issue of Ukraine will serve as a key test of the Czech political system’s resilience — particularly given the country’s role as one of the architects of the EU’s artillery procurement initiative for Ukraine. On the other hand, Andrej Babiš and his ANO party have declared their intention to terminate this initiative and stop arms deliveries to Ukrainian national defense forces.
At the very least, this is a troubling situation. Broadly speaking, it’s not just about questionable subsidy schemes or other inconvenient issues for Andrej Babiš — it’s about the Czech Republic’s commitment to the principles of EU solidarity and unity under the pressure of challenges provoked by Russia.
Independent Research Team for Policy